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Chapter I: Introduction
The Taiwan-China conflict remains one of the most potentially dangerous
situations in the international system today. A devastating war that would destabilize
Asia and also relations between the United States and China could occur if the actors
involved in the situation make radical decisions. Because of the potential severity of the
conflict, the United States has made the Taiwan-China conflict a priority in its foreign
policy since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Each of the past three US
presidents: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama have treated this issue
delicately in hopes of solving the conflict without provoking a violent confrontation with
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In many ways over the past three administrations
the foreign policy of the United States towards this issue has stayed relatively the same;
however there have been notable important changes in the policies between the three
presidents. The international relations three levels of analysis: individual level, state
level, and systemic level help explain why this policy has remained the same and why it
has changed. The individual and systemic factors mostly explain why the policy has
shifted while the state level and some systemic aspects illustrate the continuities. Of these
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three levels of analyzes, the most important factors are the economic and military realities
between the actors, and the influence that the United States military arms corporations
have on the decision-making process.
The three levels of analysis is an important framework for understanding
international relations issues such as the Taiwan-China conflict, and helps explain why
there are changes and continuities between presidential administrations. The first part of
this framework is the individual level of analysis. This level deals with the personality
and leadership qualities of the individuals who are charged with making the policy
decisions. The individual level attempts to analyze how their emotions, cognitive skills,
ambition, ego, and other such factors affect the way they act. The second level of analysis
is concerned with the state itself and the different factions that act within the state.
Analysis for this level includes understanding how the different branches of government
affect each other and also how interest groups affect the decision-making process. The
final level focuses on the systemic issues of the problem. These include external
constraints on the actors involved, the realities of the international system, and power
relationships within the international system.i The three levels of analysis are important in
understanding the Taiwan-China conflict because it takes an encompassing view on the
issue. It recognizes that multiple factors on different levels are responsible for the final
policy outcome.
Background Information
The Taiwan-China rift began during the Mao Revolution of 1949. During this
revolution, communists defeated the nationalists and took over the county. After the war,
Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek took 2 million refugees to Taiwan and vowed to
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retaliate and take back China. These refugees from China clashed with the local
population of Taiwan and started to impose to martial law on the island. The United
States started to support Taiwan after the Korean War when they sent naval ships to
protect Taiwan and act as a buffer against the expansion of communism. In the 1960s
because of the rule of the mainland minority, many native Taiwanese started to call for
independence. Shortly after this time, the United States began to improve relations with
Mainland China because the US wanted to use China as a means against the Soviet
Union. As a result the United States severed international ties with Taiwan and took the
stance of the “One China” policy. However, the United States would continue to
unofficially sell arms to Taiwan. In 1987, Taiwan officially ended its martial law policy
and became more democratic.ii On March 23 1996, Taiwan officially had its first
democratic election.iiiThis transition towards a more democratic regime would have
important implications for US foreign policy in the area.
The issue of Taiwan for the PRC is important both symbolically and politically
important. One of the focal points of Chinese military development is to attain the ability
to influence or coerce Taiwan and prevent their independence movement. For China,
commitment to a modern national-racial identity makes unification an important
nationalist and psychological goal.iv As of a result of this interest, China has increased its
military capabilities drastically over the past two decades. China has upgraded its military
with little help from the United States and many other countries because there are many
restrictions in the selling of military arms to China after the Tiananmen Square massacre
in 1989. Despite this, the Chinese have created a large arsenal of short-range missiles that
are aimed at Taiwan in the hopes that it will influence their decision to not declare formal
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independence.v China’s aggressive stance towards Taiwan has complicated the issue for
the United States and has made this situation more volatile for all the actors.
The United States has often had conflicting policies in regards to settling the
situation since 1949. In 1979 the United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA), which mandated that the US sell arms to Taiwan for its defense. However, also in
1979 the United States and China signed a Joint Communique that restarted diplomatic
relations between the two countries for the first time since 1949. This remains significant
in light of the conflict because the US transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to
Beijing and reiterated the Chinese's "One China" policy.vi On August 17, 1982 another
important Communique was signed between the US and China that stated the US would
gradually decrease its selling of arms to Taiwan and that eventually the arms trade would
end.vii This new treaty was not signed by the US Congress while the TRA was. This has
caused tension for the US because there are two conflicting treaties regarding the selling
of arms;viii however the TRA is still fulfilled because the US still sells large amounts of
military equipment to Taiwan. These treaties and the historical trends in policy towards
the issue are significant because they have a large impact on the policy options of each
president.
Taiwan and China relations recently have been relatively stable; however there
have been three major crises between Taiwan and China since 1949. The first crisis
occurred from August 11, 1954 to May 1, 1955. Following large Taiwanese troop
movements to Matsu Island and the small islands of Quemoy, China began to bombard
Quemoy. The United States reacted forcefully in support of Taiwan and even seriously
considered the use of nuclear weapons against China. After negotiations in April of 1955,
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the crisis came to halt.ixThis crisis remains significant because it was the first time that
the US came to the defense of Taiwan. By debating the use of nuclear weapons it
illustrates the commitment of the US towards Taiwan. This underlining notion of
defending Taiwan for the US has continued to influence policy for each of the last three
presidents.
The second Taiwan Crisis began in 1958 following the initiation of the “Great
Leap Forward” by the Chinese Communist Party. This movement shifted China’s foreign
policy from a “soft” approach to a more “hard” line one in 1958. Starting August 23,
1958 the Chinese began bombarding Quemoy and Matsu again and they blockaded the
islands. The United States quickly stated their support of Taiwan once this began. The
strong US response surprised the Chinese and in September of 1958 diplomatic talks
began among the actors involved.x The effect that the US response had on the Chinese
indicates the influence that the US has in the Taiwan-China conflict. The United States’
military capabilities acted as a deterrence factor in the second crisis. The US’s ability to
deter Chinese force has continued to remain vital in US policy towards the Taiwan-China
conflict.
The third Taiwan-China Crisis occurred in 1995-96. It demonstrated that the
conflict could erupt into a deadly conflict even in today’s international system. This crisis
began when Cornell University invited the President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, to speak
at the university. President Clinton at first did allow President Lee to visit. However, both
the United States House of Representatives and the US Senate went against Clinton’s
decision and overwhelmingly approved a measure to allow Lee to visit.xi The People’s
Republic of China vehemently disapproved of this visit and accused the United States of
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violating the “One China” agreement that had been in place since the 1970s. After the
visit to Cornell, the US and the PRC opened up a discussion regarding Taiwan once
again. The negotiations reached a climax when China began military exercises and
missile tests near Taiwan. The US responded by sending two aircraft carriers to the
Taiwan Strait. This heated confrontation eventually simmered and the United States and
the PRC began to have normal negotiations.xii This potential crisis exhibits the notion
that two of the most powerful countries in the world could engage in a violent conflict,
and that each president must cautiously implement policies to maintain the status quo.
Literary Review
Many articles were written as an attempt to explain the policy of each US
president towards Taiwan and China, but these articles do not attempt to understand how
the policy was constructed on all three of the levels of analysis. These articles help
highlight the important factors that contribute to why the United States has acted the way
it has in regards to the Taiwan-China conflict; however, few if any article have explicitly
examined the changes and continuities between the past three US presidents. Much of the
literature also does not directly examine how the different levels of analysis relate to each
other, and usually they just study one or two aspects of the problem. The consistencies
and changes between administrations occur because of factors in each level of analysis.
The changes between the past three administrations is also important in understanding the
aspects of the policy that will likely persist and which aspects are subject to change when
the next administration comes into power. Thus, using a three level analysis framework
when examining this issue is vital to properly understand the actions of the United States.
A couple of articles examine the personality and leadership qualities of the
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president and their impact on policy in general. These scholarly articles attempt to
understand the correlation between the foreign policy of each president and their
individual traits. These articles do not talk directly about each president’s personality and
its impact on the policy towards Taiwan. They just offer important insights into how each
president conducts general foreign policy. For example, Jason Berggren and Nicol C. Rae
state President George W. Bush had strong religious and moral convictions that were
influential in his foreign policy decisions.xiii David Frum, President Bush’s former
speechwriter, also explains how Bush’s religious and moral beliefs affected his
presidency when he said Bush was on a Crusade that was about good vs. evil. There was
also the popular view that Bush set out to make the world safe for democracy similar to
Wilson did in his presidency.xiv President Bush was not an realist and instead embraced a
Wilsonian-based ideological foreign policy.xv This remains important especially when
one examines the nature of the conflict between the democratic Taiwan and the more
authoritative government of China. As for Clinton, Michael Lyons describes how
president’s high ambition, indecisiveness, and flexibility were important components in
the formulation of his general foreign policy.xvi There is not as much literature on
President Obama’s personality because he has only been in office for just under two
years, however his character traits still play an important role in how he conducts foreign
policy. Richard Cohen talks how Obama is more of a realist in his policy decisions,xvii
and Donald Douglas describes how his patience and pragmatic standpoint towards the
international system have had an important impact on his foreign policy.xviii The
personality traits of each president and how they individually conduct foreign policy is
vital in further understanding their approach to the Taiwan-China conflict.
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There are also a number of illuminating articles that describe how many statelevel factors contribute to the US foreign policy towards Taiwan. Graham Allison helps
to explain the structural dynamics of the decision-making process and its impact on the
final outcome for a particular policy. He talks about how the government is not fully
informed, centrally controlled, and value-maximizing. Instead the government is made up
of a conglomerate of semi-feudal organizations whose final outcome on a policy can be
properly realized by understanding their standard behavior.xix This complex structural
nature of decision-making has a substantial impact on the formulation of policy towards
Taiwan. Although the President has the most authority in regards to the final outcome,
other organizations such as Congress, lobbyists, and the military industrial complex play
a vital role in shaping the President's final decision.
Graham Allison's third model of analysis also helps explain why the structural
aspects are significant. He talks about how the decision-makers for a particular policy are
not a monolithic group, but instead consist of a number of actors engaging in a
competitive political game. The final outcome for a decision is the result of compromises
made between the many actors involved.xx This relationship described by Allison helps
explain why Congress plays an important constraining role in the formulation of policy
towards Taiwan.
There are also other sources that detail the impact that state-level aspects have on
policy. One book written by retired Congressman Lee Hamilton illustrates how the
foreign policy decision-making process has become politicized, and he also talks about
how compromises between the US Congress and the Executive Branch are necessary in
the construction of foreign policy.xxi Other articles and US Congress bills help to
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illustrate how the actions of the Congress inhibit or allow the president to conduct the
foreign policy he wants. One article by Jiemian Yang illustrates this by describing how
the number of bills that Congress passes affects the foreign policy towards Taiwan. This
article also points out that the domestic interest in the issue plays a role in determining
the policy towards Taiwan, and that military lobbyists plays an important role in
determining the foreign policy too. xxii Another article by Joshua Su-Ya Wu extends on
this interest group factor and finds that the impact of Taiwan lobbyists in the US
Congress is immense and substantial.xxiii These articles are correct in understanding that
the military industrial complex and other lobbyist groups play a part in the formulation of
policy towards Taiwan, however they do not fully recognize the extent to which this is
true.
Other articles have elaborated on the impact that the military industrial complex
has on formulating US policy, but they vary on the degree in which this is true. A couple
of the articles by Henry Rosemont and James Nolt talk about how policymakers in the
United States have over-hyped the China threat in order to spend more on the military.xxiv
xxv

There are also some articles that describe the relationship between military arms

corporations donating money to Congress and the impact that it has on passing bills in
favor of increased relations with countries that will buy arms from the US. Richard
Fleisher examines PAC donations by Defense contractors and their impact on creating
policies that are favorable to their interests, such as selling military arms to Taiwan.xxvi
Some political observers, such as Jiemian believe that the military industrial complex has
been influential in all administrations, but under President Bush this influence has been
even greater.xxvii Some articles reject the notion that the military industrial complex plays
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a large role in policy formulation. Andrew Kennedy writes about how military interest
groups do not significantly affect policy towards Taiwan. The author believes that the
stakes are too risky in this conflict for the United States to be persuaded by the economic
benefits of the military contractors.xxviii These articles that deal with US military
contractors make important arguments about the impact that they have. However, they do
not place this issue in the context of all three levels of analysis as an attempt to
understand the changes and continuities between Clinton, Bush, and Obama.
Systemic level factors also play an important role in policy formulation, and there
are a couple of articles that attempt to understand their impact. One article from the
Heritage Foundation by Peter Brookes describes how the United States supports Taiwan
because it has a greater agenda of promoting democracy in the region.xxix Andrew
Kennedy’s article expands upon this and offers even more explanations for why the
United States risks a catastrophic war with China over Taiwan. These reasons include:
the “nervous” hegemon theory that states the US is using the Taiwan conflict to combat
China’s rising superiority, and the “entangled” ally theory, which states the US is
supporting Taiwan so they do not lose face by abandoning a longstanding ally.xxx These
explanations offer valuable insights into the ideology of US foreign policy; however they
do not examine the impact that state-level and individual-level factors have on the
responses of the US towards Taiwan.
Scholarly writings also detail the external constraints that affect the United States
ability to conduct foreign policy. The Defense Department released a report in 2010 that
detailed the rise of China’s military and the impact that this has on the Taiwan-China
conflict. Due to China having a greater military capabilities recently, the United States
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cannot antagonize or be too aggressive with China because they risk escalating the
conflict into a violent war.xxxi Military capabilities are not the only systemic constraint on
the US’s policy towards Taiwan. The economic reality of the two countries is also
important in understanding why the US has often remained cautious in the conflict. Keith
Bradsher details how the massive trade imbalance between the United States and China
has made the two countries reliant on each other economically. As a result of this, the
United States is constrained by the possibility of an economic backlash if they act too
drastically in regards to the Taiwan-China conflict.xxxii
The terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001 and its role in changing of policies
towards Taiwan has also been examined by scholars. One article describes how the
United States following September 11th did not want the Taiwan conflict to become a
major issue because the leaders of the US were more concerned with combating
terrorism. Jiemian Yang talks about how the US took a softer approach towards China on
the issue in order to appeal for support for terrorism related issues such as Iran and North
Korea.xxxiii The United States cannot afford to make this issue too volatile because they
have other military priorities. The reality of the post-September 11 international system
has had important implications towards changing the policy towards Taiwan and China.
Chapter II: The Policies of the three Presidents
President Bill Clinton’s Policy towards the Taiwan-China Conflict
When President Clinton took power in 1993, he approached the Taiwan-China
conflict carefully and cautiously. President Clinton used “strategic ambiguity” in his
position towards defending Taiwan.xxxiv This meant that Clinton never explicitly stated
the extent to which the United States would respond if China tried to forcefully take over
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Taiwan. Clinton also instituted the "Three Noes" policy in which the US would not
advocate for a Taiwanese independence movement, a One China, one Taiwan policy, nor
would the US lobby for Taiwan to join the UN.xxxv Despite this policy the Clinton
administration still continued the longstanding policy of selling military products to
Taiwan. During Clinton’s presidency, there was even an increase in selling military arms
to Taiwan from previous administrations.xxxvi Clinton also utilized an engagement
oriented diplomatic strategy in regards to dealing with China and the Taiwan issue.xxxvii
As mentioned before, Clinton did however try to appease the Chinese government by not
allowing President Lee to visit Cornell, which showed that his administration’s policy
towards Taiwan and China was one of retaining the status quo. Clinton did not want to
antagonize China and tried to maintain the policy of “One China”. However, once
Congress voted against Clinton’s position and China responded to President Lee’s visit
by having military exercises near Taiwan, Clinton reacted forcefully by deploying naval
ships. This action shows that Clinton wanted to maintain the “One China” policy, yet he
still was willing to risk a potential war to protect Taiwan.
President Bush’s Policies Toward Taiwan and China
President George W. Bush notably both continued and changed US policy
towards Taiwan and China from the Clinton administration. During the 2000 election
Bush campaigned that he would approach the situation differently than his predecessor,
Clinton. President Bush wanted to take a tougher stance on China and make his
commitment to Taiwan explicit. While President Clinton favored “strategic ambuigity,
President Bush’s policy centered on “strategic clarity”. This is exemplified in Bush’s
official stance on China and Taiwan during his election campaign, which stated:
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“Our policy is based on the principle that there must be no use of force by China
against Taiwan. We deny the right of Beijing to impose its rule on the free
Taiwanese people. All issues regarding Taiwan's future must be resolved
peacefully and must be agreeable to the people of Taiwan. If China violates these
principles and attacks Taiwan, then the United States will respond appropriately
in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. America will help Taiwan defend
itself."xxxviii
President Bush in 2002 even met with the Defense Minister of Taiwan for the first time
since 1979 signifying a change in attitude on the part of the US. President Bush also tried
to spur Taiwan to upgrade their military and defense infrastructures in anticipation of a
potential Chinese attack. These events and statements illustrate a change in policy over
Taiwan with President Bush, but this strong support for Taiwan would wane over the
course of Bush’s presidency.
As Bush’s presidency progressed, he realized that a strong stance on China in the
Taiwan conflict would not have the results he desired at the beginning of his presidency.
Events such as the attacks on September 11th and the continuing economic rise of China
were major factors in this change in course. President Bush realized that an unstable
Taiwan was not in his best interests regarding foreign policy considering the new
enemies that the United States was facing. Thus he lessened his stance on Taiwan;
however, this stance was still strong compared to President Clinton. Bush still proceeded
with his plans of a missile defense system around China and included Taiwan in the
strategy. A number of factors in each level of analysis can help explain the similarities
and changes between the presidencies of Clinton and Bush.
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President Obama’s Policies Towards Taiwan and China
President Barack Obama approached the Taiwan-China conflict in many of the
same ways as President Bush, albeit with a few exceptions. Before continuing on with
President Obama's approach, one must note that Obama's presidency is still relatively
new, and as a result his policy towards Taiwan and China is still subject to change.
Despite this, Obama has still made some key decisions regarding the issue that help
illustrate his policy. Similar to the preceding presidents, Barack Obama renewed the arms
deal for Taiwan of President Bush's presidency to the dismay of the PRC. Barack Obama
has also been hard-nosed on China and has tried to use this strategy to maintain stability
in the region. Barack Obama has not been shy to criticize China for its actions in the
conflict, such as its recent military buildup.xxxix Obama has also continued the policy of
upholding the "One China" policy. This is exemplified when President Obama stated in
2009 that: "I have been clear in the past that my administration fully supports a oneChina policy… We don't want to change that policy and that approach."xl Obama has also
continued the trend from the later parts of Bush's presidency by trying to engage China
and establish a constructive and stable relationship.xli Campaign promises are never fully
indicative of how the president will act when in office; however Obama's statements
during his election campaign could help highlight what his future plans might consist of.
During the election, Obama promised to find a peaceful solution for the China-Taiwan
conflict, increase military-military relations with China, increase transparency with
China, and try to ensure that China follows human rights standards.xlii Barack Obama's
statements and policies towards China and the Taiwan issue indicate that his position has
not strayed far from Bush.
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Chapter III: Individual-level Factors
Individual level factors are important in highlighting how changes in general
policy towards Taiwan and China came about but they are not as affective in
understanding the continuities. The leadership styles of each president have played a role
in formulating policy towards Taiwan. Since the leadership styles of Clinton and Bush,
and then Bush and Obama are different, it helps explain why changes in policy occurred.
The discrepancies of the three presidents stemming from foreign policy ideology and
moral outlook on the international system affected their overarching strategy towards
Taiwan and China. Some leadership aspects of the three presidents do account for several
of the continuities, but it is not as prominent.
Individual-level Factors and Clinton
There are a number of leadership characteristics and personality traits of Clinton
that could help one understand his policy towards Taiwan and China. One of his
significant personality traits was ambition, which played an underlining role in
formulating his sometimes risky foreign policy towards Taiwan and China. Both on the
campaign trail and during his two terms in office Clinton was considered ambitious. This
high ambition and determination led Clinton to gamble more in his policies.xliii This
tendency helps explain Clinton’s actions during the Taiwan-China Crisis of 1995-1996.
The placement of US naval ships in the Taiwan Strait following the military exercises of
China constitutes a foreign policy gamble. In the international system, deploying military
ships in a region to counteract another actor’s military could potentially develop into a
violent encounter. President Clinton was willing to make this gamble because he wanted
to clearly exhibit his administration’s desire to protect Taiwan from Chinese aggression.
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His actions demonstrate ambition in his desire to protect Taiwan and his willingness to
risk a violent conflict to do so. Therefore, President Clinton’s ambition and risky nature
help explain his policy towards Taiwan and China.
President Clinton’s flexibility and openness to alternate interpretations also play
an underlining role in explaining the actions of his administrations towards Taiwan and
China. Psychological tests have been tried on Clinton that indicates that he seeks personal
approval and that he also seeks flexibility. xliv Clinton’s flexible nature explains his
willingness to change his strategy towards China and Taiwan. After the 1995-1996 Crisis,
President Clinton changed his overarching strategy towards the situation. He began to
implement a “comprehensive engagement” policy to form a “constructive strategic
partnership” with China.xlv Clinton’s openness to change likely made this policy
transition easier. Thus his personality and leadership traits played a role in the overall
development of his policy towards Taiwan and China.
President Clinton’s ideology, or lack thereof, is also important in understanding
his overarching Taiwan-China policy. Clinton believes that ideology can be dangerous
because it prevents one from changing their actions. This is exemplified during his
speech at the American Center for Progress: “The problem with ideology is, if you’ve got
an ideology, you’ve already got your mind made up. You know all the answers, and that
makes evidence irrelevant and arguments a waste of time”.xlvi His views on not using an
ideological basis for policy extend into his decision-making process for Taiwan and
China. President Clinton did not have a clear and decisive overarching foreign policy
theory, nor does he have a moralist outlook on the international system like that of
President Bush Jr., which will be shown later. Not having a definitive foreign policy
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view, President Clinton is not restricted in what he can do. Along with his flexible nature,
this helps explain his willingness to change course on an issue such as Taiwan.
Individual-level Factors and Bush
President Bush’s personality and leadership traits have had a significant impact on
why he has notably changed some aspects of the overall direction of US policy towards
Taiwan from Clinton. One of the most significant traits of Bush was his moral and
religious outlook on foreign policy, which helps explain the change in an overarching
strategy from Clinton. President Bush was an evangelical Christian and his religion
affected the way he viewed global conflicts.xlvii President Bush saw Taiwan and its
democracy as the “good” country that needed protection from the authoritative China.
This explanation is simplified; however it still helps illustrate why President Bush
differed from President Clinton. Bush took a stronger stance on defending Taiwan
because his religious and moral convictions influenced his foreign policy decisions.
Although the former President changed his stance and became softer on the TaiwanChina conflict as his presidency progressed, he still viewed the conflict through a
religious and moral lens. The president had to take a softer stance because he needed the
support of China to combat an enemy more dangerous to the international system:
terrorism. Therefore, his religious and moral view on foreign policy significantly
impacted his decision-making process in regards to the Taiwan-China conflict.
President Bush’s hawkish nature also had a large influenced on his approach
towards the conflict and why his policies changed from Clinton. President Bush has often
been considered a part of the conservative right. This conservative right is more hawkish
and still has a Cold War mentality on foreign policy decisions. President Bush’s
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administration viewed China through a prism of ideology as the inevitable enemy similar
to the Soviet Union. xlviii This Cold-War mentality helps illuminate Bush’s tough stance
on China. Since the Bush administration had a Cold War mentality in regards to China, it
follows that many of the policies would mirror those used against the Russians. Like with
Russia, the United States wanted to have a strong stance that prevented any action that
would try and impede upon a democratic state. Thus, Bush's firm policy towards China is
partially a result of his administration's hawkish perception of the international system.
Individual-level Factors and Obama
Obama had a different leadership style than Bush, but unlike how the differences
between Bush and Clinton led to changes, Obama’s style has allowed his administration
to follow the policies of Bush. Barack Obama’s pragmatist approach for his foreign
policy helps explain why he was willing to continue the policies of Bush.xlix Obama has
not followed in the footsteps of Bush and based his foreign policy on ideology and
morality. Although this distinction between the two presidents would likely lead one to
believe that Obama would change his policy towards Taiwan and China, his pragmatic
view of the international system in fact leads him to continue Bush's policies. There are
many complex dimensions to the Taiwan-China conflict, and although Bush had an
ideological basis for his decisions, Obama still follows Bush's policies because a stable
Taiwan-China relationship is important for the United States. A radical shift in emphasis
could create undesirable instabilities. Obama understands that one cannot antagonize
China too much and risk an unstable relationship considering the economic and potential
violent consequences. By following in the footsteps of Bush, Obama shows that he
understands that a Taiwan policy must support the Taiwanese, but also at the same time
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not anger the Chinese to a certain point. Therefore, Obama's stance on Taiwan and China
can be directly related to his pragmatic leadership style.
Another key aspect of President Obama's personality and leadership style is his
flexibility in his decision-making process, which helps explain his willingness to follow
Bush’s policies. Obama is similar to Clinton in that both are open to diverse viewpoints
and willing to listen when in the decision-making process.l In the same way that Clinton's
flexibility affected his decisions towards Taiwan, Obama's flexibility has influenced the
final policy towards the issue. Obama campaigned on the basis that he would
fundamentally change from the Bush administration the way the United States interacted
with the world. This has been true for a number of foreign policy issues, however as
mentioned before Obama has often continued many of the policies of Bush in regards to
Taiwan. The strategy towards the conflict that Obama inherited was largely enacted by
Republican conservatives who do not share the same foreign policy philosophy as
Obama. However, Obama still proceeded and continued with Bush's policy. Obama was
willing to take into account viewpoints from the opposite political spectrum. Therefore,
by following policies from the opposing political party, Obama illustrates that his
flexibility influences his decisions regarding the Taiwan and China conflict.
Chapter IV: State-Level Factors
There are also structural aspects of the decision-making process that contribute to
the continuity between the presidents. Presidents do not possess a unitary ability to
formulate foreign policy. Congress and interest groups play a role in the final policy.
These structural aspects have varying degrees of influence with military arms interest
groups having the most influence of the structural aspects. Congress has a large impact as
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well, but it can only make significant decisions in special cases and usually can only
marginally affect the overall policy towards Taiwan. Lobbyists have the least amount of
significance because they cannot dictate policy, but can only raise awareness and try to
influence Congress.
Executive vs. Legislative Branch
The structural aspect pertaining to the relationship between the executive branch
and legislative branch is important in understanding many of the continuities between the
three presidents. In creating foreign policy, the government can respond to foreign
events. Technically the United States Congress must approve a measure that is in
response to an international situation but most of the time it follows the president lead.
The executive branch can also make policy statements regarding an issue, negotiate an
international agreement, and propose legislation for Congress to approve. However,
despite the power that the President wields, the legislative branch has a lot of input in the
foreign policy process. Congress can enact resolutions and policy statements, legislative
directives, legislative restrictions/funding denials, informal advice and congressional
oversight. Congress does not wield as much power as the executive branch in the
decision making process, however they are able to slightly change the President's foreign
policy.li Congress is also vital in understanding the policy decisions of the president
because the executive branch does not solely dictate the final outcome of policy. As such,
Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have all had to deal and make compromises with
the US Congress in orchestrating a successful policy towards Taiwan and China. Thus by
understanding the intentions and role of Congress in each of these administrations, one
can further grasp how the changes and continuity between presidents came about.
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The United States Congress throughout all three administrations has played an
important role in maintaining an overall pro-Taiwan policy. The United States Congress
has consistently been one of Taiwan's greatest supporters.lii Congress has favored the
Taiwanese over the Chinese for a number of reasons that involve the military industrial
complex and lobbyists. There are also ideological reasons for their support with the main
one being that Congress sympathizes with Taiwan due to shared democratic and human
rights values.liii Unlike many other issues, the Taiwan conflict does not generate intense
partisan divide within Congress; instead most Democrats and Republicans support
Taiwan over China. This sentiment towards Taiwan is important in understanding how
each presidential administration is constrained by Congress. All three presidents must
accommodate this in their foreign policy. Thus this constraining factor partially explains
continuity between the past three presidents in regards to supporting Taiwan.
The United States Congress has played an important constraining role in President
Clinton's administration's policy towards the Taiwan conflict. One of the main examples
of this influence has been mentioned earlier. This pertains to how the US Congress
overwhelmingly approved Taiwan’s President Lee visit. President Clinton's
administration initial policy of disallowing the president to visit was a function of Clinton
trying to uphold the status quo and avoid antagonizing China. Since the President could
not ignore Congress's actions, he had to significantly alter his policy towards the issue of
the visiting President Lee. Again as mentioned before, this had significant consequences.
As such, even though the Clinton administration knew that a visit by the Taiwanese
President could destabilize the conflict, the President had little to no choice on the matter.
Therefore, this exemplifies that Congress for better or for worse has an enormous impact
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on the decision-making process in the Taiwan-China issue.
During Clinton's presidency, Congress also enacted other measures that tried to
force the administration to further support Taiwan's position. In 2000, members of the
House of Representatives passed a resolution, which was named the Taiwan Security
Enhancement, which called for the administration to more clearly follow the Taiwan
Relations Act. This resolution was adamantly opposed by the Clinton Administration.
However, the Senate never took this bill up and as a result it only remained a House
Resolution.liv This resolution could not have the desired results of affecting foreign policy
because both Houses of Congress did not pass the bill. This failed resolution illustrates
that although Congress typically supports Taiwan more than the President, the internal
system and rules of Congress sometimes prevents itself from enacting the desired policy.
Therefore after examining some of Congress's actions during the Clinton administration,
one realizes that Congress has had some success in forcing the president's policy to
become more pro-Taiwan; however, Congress cannot always influence the President's
decisions in regards to Taiwan and China.
During President Bush's presidency, Congress also played a similar role from that
of the Clinton's administration in the Taiwan-China policy construction, which helps
explain many of the continuities between the two administrations. Between 2002-2006
there were twenty-four different Taiwan-related legislations introduced on the House
floor. From all 50 states, there were a total of 547 cosponsors with about an average of 23
co-sponsors per resolution. Almost all of these measures also passed unanimously too.lv
Again this shows that Congress continued its strong support of Taiwan during the Bush's
administration. Although President Bush had a strong relationship with Taiwan, he was
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still limited in his policy options due to Congress. Therefore, part of the continuity for the
strong support towards Taiwan between the Clinton and Bush administrations can be
partially attributed to the power relationship between the Executive and Legislative
branches, and the measures that the latter branch enacted.
During Obama's administration, the United States Congress has also further
continued the trend of ensuring that president remains supportive of Taiwan. The Obama
administration has only been in office for one Congressional session, the 111th session,
yet there has still been some notable Congressional measures. These include
H.CON.RES.18, which centers around allowing improving Taiwan relations and trying to
help them become an official statelvi and H.CON.RES.200 which condemns China for
placing ballistic missiles pointing at Taiwan.lvii These two resolutions illustrate that
Congress's tendency to favor Taiwan has not waned since the Clinton administration.
Another notable aspect of these two resolutions is that H.CON.RES.18 has mostly
republican cosigners while H.CON.RES.2000 has mostly democratic cosigners. This
helps exhibit the notion that the Taiwan conflict does not have a deeply politicized
partisan divide within Congress like many other foreign and domestic issues. Similar to
the previous two administrations, these Congressional responses to the conflict limit and
influence the potential policy decisions that President Obama can undertake. Obama does
not always need to follow the stances of Congress but they ensure, like they did with
Clinton and Bush, that he cannot stray too far from a pro-Taiwan position.
Lobbyists and Their Influence
Taiwan and China lobbyists have played a role in both the continuation and
changes in final policy of each of the three presidents, however this influence is marginal
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and not as significant as other structural aspects. Each lobbyist group tries to influence
both the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch; however they have more impact
on the Legislative Branch. Interest groups for Taiwan and China try to raise awareness
and spend money in hopes of swaying members of the decision-making process to
endorse their position. Taiwanese lobbyists want Congress to continue their longstanding
pro-Taiwan policy while Chinese lobbyists have tried to undermine this support. Over the
past three administrations Taiwanese lobbyists have been vastly more influential than
Chinese lobbyists over the issue; however the Taiwan lobbyists have lost some of the
power since the beginning of the Clinton administration, and as such their significance in
continuing a pro-Taiwan policy has diminished.
During the Clinton Administration, Taiwan related lobbyists had their highest
degree of influence among the three presidents on United States policy towards the
conflict. Taiwan lobbyists, from the grassroots up to the official Taiwan diplomats, have
usually been influential in helping shape a sympathetic Taiwan policy.lviii During the
Clinton administration, this remained evident. Taiwan lobbying during the Clinton
administration followed the historical trend of such lobbyists being strong, robust, and
having lots of influence.lix They had a unified position in which to try and rally support
among members of Congress, which allowed them to have more success. They spent
money and raised awareness among the members of Congress, which then helped gain
them support.
Because Taiwan had such a large influence in American politics, China during
Clinton's administration sought to generate greater influence within Congress and the
American public. This change in emphasis on the part of China occurred after the Taiwan

25
Crisis of 1995-96, when they realized the impact that Taiwan had on US domestic
politics.lx This was called the "China Plan" but it proved controversial because there were
allegations that there was illegal trading of secrets and funds in order to implement this
plan. There was even allegations that this controversy might have even affected the
presidential race that year in which Clinton won re-election. This was proven to be false
and the verdict regarding the presidential election was that this controversy had minimal
significance during the election.lxi However, because of the scandal that followed the
"China Plan", the Chinese lobbyists failed to achieve its goal of generating greater
support for China. It most likely only further strengthened the opposition towards China
within the American public and Congress. Thus, because of the negative publicity of
Chinese lobbyists and the large positive impact of lobbyists pertaining to Taiwan,
lobbyists had an important influence on domestic and Congressional perceptions and
views during the Clinton Administration. Therefore, since as mentioned before proTaiwan sentiment within Congress has a role in shaping foreign policy, Clinton's proTaiwan strategy can be partially explained by the role of lobbyists.
During the Bush administration lobbyists would continue to have a marginal
impact on continuing the pro-Taiwan policy; however this influence diminished
compared to the Clinton administration. One of the main reasons for this decrease in
sway among lobbyists pertains to the democratization and increased pluralism of Taiwan.
Once Taiwan started holding democratic elections, the KMT "machine" that used to
lobby on behalf of a unified stance for Taiwan eroded due to the presence of other
political parties. Now there many Taiwan messages and some congressional observers
believe that this lack of a unified message has diminished the lobbyists influence in
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Congress.lxii This erosion of the KMT "machine" began during the Clinton administration
it became more significant after the 2000 election, right before Bush came into power.
This erosion became magnified because the main lobbyist organization in the US: Taipei
Economic Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) lost much of its support from
Taiwanese government. The new DPP government at the time did not trust TECRO
because of its previous ties with the KMT party, and as such the clout that the lobbying
group once had diminished.lxiii Because of this reduced influence on the part of lobbyists
during the Bush administration, the president did not face the same external pressures that
President Clinton faced during his presidency. As a result, during the later years of his
presidency, Bush could more easily take a more conciliatory stance towards China in
regards to the conflict.
Lobbyists still marginally helped maintain the pro-Taiwan policy from Bush to
Obama. The trend of Taiwan supporting Political Action Committee (PAC) donations to
members of Congress has continued relatively the same going into the Obama
administration.lxiv The amount of money spent by the main Taiwan related PAC has not
significantly changed since the presidency of George Bush. This helps illustrates that
lobbying firms in favor of Taiwan have not significantly changed their behavior in the
advent of a new president, and as such they have continued the process of raising
awareness and spending money to influence congressional votes. Since their behavior
between the two presidents has stayed relatively the same, it follows that their limited
influence on continuing a pro-Taiwan policy has remained unchanged.
Military Industrial Complex
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The military industrial complex has played a substantial role in continuing the
pro-Taiwan policy of each president. Taiwan is currently the top Asian buyer of United
States military equipment.lxv Since the United States has obliged to sell military arms to
Taiwan, many military arms corporations have become involved with ensuring the
continuation of such a policy. Military arms corporations like to sell to Taiwan because
they possess a large foreign currency reserve to spend without the need of US
government credit or loans from plans like the Foreign Military Finance Program.lxvi This
advantage for the military industrial complex has resulted in the industry donating
massive amounts of money to Congress, and it has allowed many in the industry to
become involved in the decision-making process to try and influence a financially
favorable Taiwan policy. They have been successful in influencing an advantageous
policy and as a result they have had a profound impact on why all three presidents have
continued the policy of ensuring the selling of arms to Taiwan even in the face of intense
opposition from China.
The military contractors also have pro-Taiwan sentiment because there are many
limitations to selling to China. After the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989 the United States
along with many other countries stopped selling military equipment to China. The US has
recently begun to sell military to China again, but the United States still drastically
outsells equipment to Taiwan than to China.lxvii This difference helps explain why
contractors in the United States are much more inclined to try and influence a pro-Taiwan
policy than a pro-China policy.
The military industrial complex is important to each of the presidential
administrations and Congress for a number of reasons. Economically, military contractors
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provide thousands of jobs and revenue. For many members of Congress who have
military factories in this district, the demands of the military contractors ar
aree taken
seriously. International agreements for trading of arms are also crucial in maintaining
these contractors financially especially when one recognizes that the domestic demand
for military equipment
ipment has recently decreased
decreased.lxviii Military arms trade is also
o crucial for
the United States because it helps balance the trade deficit with m
many
any countries including
Taiwan.lxix Because of the benefits that these contractors provide, they are able to
influence policy in many substantial ways.
Two of the major militar
military
y arms corporations, Lockheed and Boeing, have made
significant contributions in order to dictate a pro
pro-Taiwan
Taiwan strategy. In the case of an arms
sale, the Executive Branch along with the United States Congress must approve the
measure according to the Const
Constitution.
itution. As such, lobbying efforts and PAC donations to
Congress from military corporations like Lockheed and Boeing can have a large impact
on the final outcome off an arms policy towards Taiwan. Their contributions are shown in
the graphs below.
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As shown above in Graphs 1.0 and 2.0, Lockheed Martin and Boeing have donated
substantial amounts of money help further their own cause. If one looks at Lockheed
Martin and to a lesser extent Boeing, one can recognize that their donations have
increased relative to other periods during 1996, 2000
2000-02, and 2008-10.
10. These periods
correlate to times where the United States has debated and then eventually authorized the
sale of military weapons to Taiwan. Whether this is ca
causal will be discussed within the
context of each presidential administration. Lockheed Martin and Boeing's lobbying
efforts have had considerable success according to the non
non-partisan
partisan group Center for
Responsive Politics. Lockheed Martin and Boeing have lobbying influence scores of 66
and 64 out of 100 for 2010 respectively
respectively.lxxii lxxiii This might not seem that high but this
number is only for 2010 when the debate over a new arms deal for Taiwan ended early in
the year. Also compared to other famously known lobbying groups su
such
ch as Goldman
Sachs, whose score was an 80 in 2010, these numbers illustrate that major military
contractors have a relatively high degree of influence with their lobbying efforts.
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The military industrial complex is also influential in continuing the policies
between the three presidents because of the connections within the bureaucracy of the
decision-making process. Lockheed Martin and Boeing are part of the United States State
Department's International Security Advisory Board.lxxiv This interconnection between
the top two military contractors and an important foreign policy bureaucratic organization
only furthers the point that these corporations have a large amount of input in the US's
policies towards Taiwan. Some such as the Director at the Center of Public Integrity
argue: "the defense industry is one of the major industries that enjoys close ties with the
US government".lxxv These close ties between the military industrial complex and the
government indicate that contractors have a significant degree of influence in the
formulation of policy. Thus this high degree of influence helps explain the continuities in
arms deals with Taiwan for the last three presidents.
President Clinton's administration was affected by the lobbying and donation
efforts of the military industrial complex. As mentioned before Clinton continued the
trend of adhering to the TRA and selling weapons to Taiwan. There is even the view that
Clinton was more receptive to selling arms to Taiwan than his predecessors; however he
refused to sell items that were not necessary to security, such as diesel submarines and
electronic war systems for frigates.lxxvi Clinton wanted to uphold the TRA, but at the
same time he did not want the Chinese to feel too anxious regarding the buildup of
Taiwan. If one examines Graphs 1.0 and 2.0, it is evident that for both contractors 1996
and 1998 signified an increase in efforts. This increase likely correlates to the next graph
where the US dramatically increased their arms dealings to Taiwan.
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This correlation between the lobbying efforts of Boeing and Lockheed, and the steep
increase in US arms sales to Taiwan is clearly causal. An arms deal to Taiwan is a major
source of revenue for military contractors and as a result their efforts to dictate policy are
highly likely to increase. Because of this the US Congress is more likely to advocate and
sign for a larger deal. As a result President Clinton's policy towards the Taiwan-China
conflict becomes more pro-Taiwan.
President Bush's administration faced similar pressure from the military industrial
complex, and as such this largely explains the continuities in his arms trade policy from
the Clinton administration. During President Bush’s tenure, arms trading with Taiwan
decreased from Clinton, but this is largely due to the aftereffects of the Taiwan Crisis of
1995-96 diminishing. US arms trading with Taiwan was still significant even though the
extreme levels of trading following the Third Taiwan Crisis came down. Using a
correlation between the graphs above and the dates of international agreements for arms
trade with Taiwan, one recognizes that again military contractors have influenced US
policy. In 2000-2002 there is a spike in money spent by Lockheed Martin and Boeing,
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and it is likely that this is no coincidence with the arms deal that President Bush agreed
on in 2001 with Taiwan. One must note that these spikes in money spent could also be
attributed to other reasons such as the competition for the right to construct the new Joint
Strike Fighter Program in 2001.lxxviii However, despite this these numbers still help
illustrate that lobbying for military contractors increases in the period leading up to an
arms deal with Taiwan. Also, as indicated in Graphs 1.0 and 2.0, in 2004-2006 there is a
high level of lobbying efforts for Boeing while there is an increase in lobbying efforts for
Lockheed. This correlates to an increase in arms dealing with Taiwan of 2004-2006 as
illustrated in Graph 3.0. During this period Taiwan was actually the leading arms trade
partner with the US, which helps further the point that military lobbyists had a large
impact on US arms policy towards Taiwan. Therefore, this helps explain the continuities
between the two presidents pro-Taiwan policy regarding military arms deals towards
Taiwan.
Connections among members of the Bush administration and military contractors
also help illustrate the continuities between Bush and Clinton. Two of the more notable
examples of interconnection between military contractors and the US government during
the presidency of Bush include United States Vice President Dick Cheney's ties with
Lockheed Martin and the vice president of Lockheed Martin during Bush's
administration. The Vice President in Bush’s administration, Dick Cheney, had ties to
Lockheed Martin because his wife served on the board from 1995 until his inauguration
in 2001. The vice president of Lockheed Martin, Bruce Jackson, during the Bush
administration was also a financial chair and fundraiser for Bush's 2000 campaign.lxxix
These two examples illustrate that during the Bush administration there were some
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notable conflict of interests regarding the government and contractors. This high-profile
connectivity helps further explain Bush's pro-Taiwan stance regarding arms trade even in
the face of trying to engage China.
Military contractors have also had a significant impact on the formulation of arms
trade policy in Barack Obama's administration, and as a result it helps explain why
continuities exist between Obama and Bush. During Obama’s administration there has
been a drastic increase in spending by the lobbyists. The graphs 1.0 and 2.0 indicate this
sharp increase in 2008-09. This phenomenon likely correlates to the debate regarding a
new massive arms deal that Obama signed in the beginning of 2010. This arm deals states
the United States will sell $6.4 billion worth of military equipment, including missiles,
advanced communication systems, naval ships, and helicopters to Taiwan.lxxx This move
greatly angered the Chinese yet the United States still went through with deal. The large
spike mentioned earlier in spending by Boeing and Lockheed are likely partially
responsible for this massive arms deal. The two corporations also might have decided to
devote greater resources to this undertaking because the United States has recently begun
to scale back its military operations in Iraq. This scale back results in a loss of revenue
for these corporations and as such they likely realized that a substantial arms deal with
Taiwan could help them recover from their expected losses. Therefore, the continuation
between President Bush and Obama regarding an arms deal with Taiwan even when the
two are trying to engage China can be attributed to the large influence that the military
industrial complex has on the government's decision-making process.
Chapter V: Systemic-level Factors
For each presidential administration, systemic factors of the international order
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have played a significant role in shaping their foreign policy towards Taiwan. Systemic
factors account for both changes and continuities in policies between the three presidents,
however they have had a greater impact on the changes. These factors include the impact
of the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, the politics of Taiwan and China, and
power relations between the United States and China. Because of these factors, the three
presidents often have to rationally limit their options in regards to the Taiwan conflict.
Each of these systemic factors has undergone some form of change from the dawn of the
Clinton presidency to present day. As such, by understanding the changing nature of the
systemic factors, one understands that these factors play an important role in the
continuities and changes between the presidential administrations.
The Impact of the September 11th Attacks
The terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 marked the beginning of a new era
in the international system and was responsible for a large change in policy regarding
Taiwan. In the aftermath of the attack, the United States and many of its allies had a new
enemy: terrorism, which was neither easily identifiable nor easy to eliminate. The War on
Terror, which was begun by George W. Bush shortly after 911, sought to defeat terrorism
wherever it might exist. This monumental task required a lot of resources and
commitment for the United States and its allies. Before the attacks, the US wanted to
begin to have an increased presence in Asia, but due to the attacks the US had to change
their overall foreign policy strategy and focus on the Middle East, where the terrorist
threat is mostly located. This change in emphasis forced the United States to change their
policy towards China because they now needed China's assistance in the War on Terror.
The United States has attempted to use China as a point of leverage against countries
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vital in the War on Terrorism, such as Iran and Pakistan.lxxxi
This new focus on terrorism pertains to the Taiwan-China conflict for a number of
reasons. The United States recognizes that in today's post-911 international system, an
unstable Taiwan-China conflict is not in their best interests.lxxxii In regards to China the
cooperation between the US and the PRC has been limited; however the tone and context
of counterterrorism has helped stabilize and transform the bilateral relationship.lxxxiii
Because of these external limits placed upon the United States, the two presidents
following the 911 attacks have had to alter their policy to ensure that the conflict remains
stable so that it does not compromise other foreign policy interest. A consequence of the
US insistence of China's help on the War on Terror is that the United States cannot take
such an aggressive stance in supporting Taiwan.
The attacks on September 11th 2001 help illuminate some of the causes that led to
changes and continuities between Clinton and Bush administrations. For Clinton, he did
not govern in the new international system, and as a result he was not limited in his
foreign policy options in regards to Taiwan. Clinton likely could not have acted as
aggressively in the Taiwan Crisis of 1995-96. Such an action in today's international
system would not just have potentially destructive consequences for the US-China
relationship but also towards the status of the War on Terror. Clinton did not usually have
a heated relationship with China, and as a result an aggressive policy towards China in
regards to the Taiwan conflict was more open than for the subsequent two presidents.
The attacks on September 11th had an administration altering affect on the Bush
presidency, which subsequently led to a change in policy towards Taiwan. As mentioned
before, President Bush changed his outlook on foreign policy and began to view the
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international system as a battleground for good vs. evil. President Bush's foreign policy is
often defined by his actions to combat the War on Terror. As such, this new priority
changed his stance on the Taiwan conflict. Bush started his administration with an
aggressive hawkish policy towards China. However, following 911 Bush began to follow
Clinton's lead in regards to China. He proceeded to approach the Taiwan situation with
care and caution.lxxxiv Bush no longer adamantly defended Taiwan because he did not
wish to antagonize China nor endanger the stability of the area. Therefore, the relative
continuity between Clinton and Bush's later policies can be partially explained by the
events of September 11, 2001.
Some of president Obama's continuities with the Bush administration are also
attributable to the post-911 international system. Obama must attend to many of the same
issues that the Bush administration dealt with in the new global order. Like President
Bush, Obama must attempt keep the conflict stable because of other foreign policy
interests involving China and terrorism. As mentioned before Obama to a large extent has
tried to maintain the balance in the region and in the relationship with China. Despite
this, one must note that the US desire to appease China after 911 is still sometimes not
greater than the obligation to fulfill the TRA. After the announcement of the 2010 arms
deal with Taiwan, China repeatedly expressed its displeasure with the deal. China's
response has been some of the strongest in years and they stated that if the US approved
the new deal that cooperation between the two countries would suffer.lxxxv Despite the
consequences for the War on Terror and US-China cooperation, Obama still proceeded
with the deal. This illustrates that the post-911 realities that often force the US to appease
China do not always exist.
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Power Relations Between the United States and China
The US relationship with the PRC and its impact on US policy in regards to the
War on Terrorism helps to illuminate a larger issue: the new power relations between the
United States and China. The changing nature of the relationship has significantly
contributed to continuities in policies between the presidents, but more often it has forced
the three presidents to update and change their policy. China's rise over the past two
decades has shifted the international system and as such the acting president must
sufficiently deal with this. China has drastically progressed both its economy and its
military capabilities in this time. As a consequence of this progress China might
eventually change the international order from a unipolar to a bipolar or multipolar
system. In response to this and China's progress the US has changed the nature of its
interaction with China. In many ways the US has tried to improve relations with China.
However, there is a growing fear of a rising China in the US thus the US has often
become more hostile towards to China. These shifts have had a profound impact on the
Taiwan conflict. The United States now must balance its interests with a rising China
with its interests towards Taiwan. Therefore a large part of both the continuities and
changes between the three administration can be attributed to power relations between the
United States and China.
Economic Aspect of Power Relationship
In regards to the economy this power shift is one of the main reasons why US
policy towards Taiwan has undergone significant changes since the dawn of the Clinton
administration. Since the Clinton administration the economic growth of China has
drastically increased as illustrated in the Graph 4.0.
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An economically rising China has had a significant impact on the United States. As a
result of the substantial economic growth, China has begun to buy US Treasury Holdings
as indicated by the Graph 5.0.
Graph 5.0
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With this increased debt, the United States cannot afford to antagonize China too much
and risk an economic backlash. Along with the massive debt that the US has towards
China, another key economic factor is the appreciation of Chinese currency. The United
States feels that China's RMB has been undervalued for some time and that is negatively
impacting the US economy. This sentiment in the US has led to anti-China rhetoric
among US politicians and among the public. This then leads to calls for a tougher stance
on China in general. As a result this sentiment spills into the Taiwan conflict and
therefore the politicians become more supportive of Taiwan.
For President Clinton the economic relationship between the US and China
played an important role in the formulation of policy towards Taiwan, but the impact was
not as significant as it would become in the subsequent administrations. As illustrated in
the Graph 4.0, China had not become an economic superpower when Clinton took office.
China had just begun to rise but it did not command the influence that it does now. As for
the debt during the Clinton administration, it was not a major issue that affected his

39
policy towards China and Taiwan. Similar to the systemic factors related to a pre-911
international order, Clinton was not limited in his options towards China. For example he
could afford to escalate the situation as he did in 1995-96 without dire economic
consequences.
President Bush on the other hand had to balance the United States' economic
interests in his policies toward Taiwan, and as a result his policies towards China had to
change from Clinton’s administration. During his administration China emerged as an
economic superpower. As noted in the Graph 5.0, during his presidency US debt to China
skyrocketed. This increased debt placed pressure on Bush and he could not take an
aggressive pro-Taiwan stance without angering China. This external constraint on his
policies helps explain his shifting policy towards Taiwan during his tenure. When the
debt to China was not too massive he could afford to utilize a hawkish foreign policy
towards China in regards to the Taiwan conflict. However, as his presidency progressed
the debt became more significant and prominent. Bush could not maintain his aggressive
Chinese policy without economic consequences. Thus, this helps explain his
administration's policy shift towards an engagement-oriented strategy with regards to
China in the conflict.
Bush had to shift his policy due to the debt; however there were internal pressures
on him maintaining an aggressive anti-China policy because of the evaluation of the
RMB. The RMB evaluation has become a prevalent issue among many politicians in the
US. Strong anti-China sentiment has emerged because of this evaluation and this likely
contributes toward the continuing trend of the US Congress opposing China on issues
such as Taiwan. Because of these domestic views against China, Bush cannot become too
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friendly with China without some political backlash. Therefore this partially contributes
to the answer of why Bush did not try to fully appease the Chinese in regards to the
Taiwan-China conflict.
These economic factors have been largely influential in Obama continuing the
policy trends of George Bush. The economic rise of China has not stagnated during
Obama's two years as president. China still possesses large quantities of the US debt. As
of 2009 China holds about $1 trillion of the US's $10 trillion debt.lxxxviii The issue of the
RMB and the detrimental affect it has on sentiment towards China has continued.
Another key economic component for the Obama administration is that the US is willing
to manage China's recent economic rise but it does not want China to become an
economic hegemony in the area.lxxxix As of result of these economic conditions and
strategies Obama faces the same internal and external pressures when formulating policy
towards Taiwan. Therefore these factors partially explain why Obama has continued
Bush's later policies of engaging China while maintaining close ties with Taiwan.
Military Aspect of Power Relationship
The military aspect of the power relationship between the US and China is one of the
most important reasons for why there are both changes and continuities in US policies.
Increased military capabilities between the two countries have played a fundamental role
in developing a policy towards Taiwan for each of the three presidents. China has
upgraded its military since the beginning of the Clinton administration; however this
increased military is still punitive compared to the US military.
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Graph 6.0 shows that despite a 21% increase in military expenditures, China still
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This military superiority has given each administration more options when dealing with
China. The US recognizes that with a superior military it can deter China from invading
Taiwan.
Despite this massive military advantage for the US, the worry is that China will
develop capabilities to attack Taiwan and prevent the US from successfully intervening.
For the last three administrations China has not attacked Taiwan; however there are
suspicions that if their nonviolent means of coercing Taiwan fail to work they might try
to use force. A 2009 Congressional Report indicates that China recently has upgraded
their military to fight short duration conflicts.xcii This recent buildup in short duration
military arms is likely implemented so that China can neutralize Taiwan’s defense before
the US could successfully intervene.xciii This remains important because if China decided
to attack Taiwan their goal would be a quick and swift takeover of the island. Therefore
this recent buildup only reaffirms the fear that China could try to quickly take over
Taiwan with minimal to no military involvement from the US.
For President Clinton, the military relationship played a significant role in
developing his policy towards Taiwan. Because of the US's military superiority, he could
risk deploying navy ships during the 1995-96 crisis. This was a symbolic military act that
showed that the US was serious about preventing China from bullying Taiwan. The threat
of US intervention probably lowered the risk. Rationally China understands that if a war
occurred the US would likely be victorious because of their military superiority.
Therefore this illustrates that during Clinton's presidency the superior military
capabilities of the US helped play an important role in his policy of maintaining the status
quo and stability in the conflict.
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For President Bush, the military power relationship between the US and China
also played an important role in developing his stronger stance towards China from
Clinton. When Bush tried to take a hard-line stance on China in the beginning of his
presidency he could afford to take such a stance because of his country's military
advantage. His "strategic clarity" defense position had to be taken seriously by the
Chinese because of the superiority the US enjoyed militarily. Just as in Clinton's case,
Bush's military advantage and commitment to Taiwan likely deterred the Chinese from
taking any violent drastic measures against Taiwan because of the risk of the US
retaliating. Bush strived to maintain the status quo of the situation like Clinton. The
military superiority that he enjoyed during his presidency allowed him to succeed in this
regards.
Since the military advantage of the US has not wavered in the Obama
administration, Obama has had success in continuing the policies of Bush and
maintaining the status quo. Because the military disparity between the two remains, albeit
to a lesser degree, the deterrence factor of the US military still exists. It aids the Obama
administration just like it did during the Clinton and Bush administrations. The recent
buildup for China could potentially change the status quo in the future though because
China is developing weapons that could prevent the US from helping Taiwan. The
Chinese buildup for a possible war with Taiwan reaffirms the notion that the US and
Taiwan must continue to amount a defense policy. Therefore, this need partially explains
why Obama continued the policy of following the TRA and even helps exhibits why he
signed such a massive arms deal with Taiwan. Although Obama is obliged by the TRA to
sell arms to Taiwan, it is unlikely that the US would engage in such a large military arms
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deal with Taiwan if China did not present a serious military threat considering the
adverse effects it had on US-China relations. Thus the military power relationship
between the US, China, and Taiwan has played a substantial role in the formulation of
policy for Obama.
Taiwanese Politics
The ideologies of the Chinese and Taiwanese government have important
implications for the US in the decision-making process, and as such their actions have
had an important impact on changes in policies between the presidents. China has
undergone individual changes in regards to their leadership since the dawn of the Clinton
administration; however their stance towards Taiwan has not significantly wavered. Since
China's government is a one-party system, the same party with the same ideology has
remained in power. Taiwan on the other hand has gone through significant political
changes that have affected their outlook on the conflict. The two major parties in Taiwan,
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Koumintang (KMT), have different
ideologies regarding how to approach the conflict. The KMT supports a "One China"
policy while the DPP advocates Taiwan becoming a separate entity from China.xciv The
ideologies of the two major parties have had a large amount of influence on each of the
three presidents.
For most of President Clinton’s tenure, Taiwan was ruled by President Lee and
the KMT party. This had important implications in Clinton’s policies towards Taiwan.
Lee was a member of the more conciliatory KMT, yet he still managed to escalate the
situation with China. The most notable examples include his trip to the US that spawned
the 1995-96 crisis and his statements in 1999 in which he said Taiwan and China should
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be on a "special state-to-state" basis.xcv This statement implied that Taiwan was a separate
state from China and resulted in another military display similar to the one in 1995-96 by
the Chinese. These two incidents put Clinton in a tough position in which he had to
respond. Since Clinton wanted to utilize an ambiguous policy towards Taiwan, these two
international incidents forced him to take a definitive position regarding the conflict.
Thus this illustrates that the political makeup and leadership of Taiwan affected Clinton’s
policy.
The political atmosphere during Bush's presidency also influenced his policies,
and forced Bush to change his policies to one that required him to sometimes shy away
from strong pro-Taiwan rhetoric. During Bush's administration the DPP came into power.
The leader of the Republic of Taiwan from 2000-2008, President Chen, worried both the
Chinese and the Bush administration. Bush saw the president as a troublemakerxcvi while
the Chinese regarded him as an envelope pusher and a risk taker.xcvii Cross strait dialogue
between Taiwan and China beyond seeking detente did not exist during Chen's
tenure.xcviii This had important implications for the policies of Bush because Chen added
extra tensions to an already volatile conflict. Through his strong separatist statements
Chen caused tensions between the US and Taiwan. Chen's referendum for independence
in 2004 put the Bush administration in the unique position of criticizing the Taiwanese
while defending the Chinese.xcix Other similar problems with the Chen administration
would occur which influenced Bush's new direction of more engagement with China.
Therefore this illustrates that Chen's controversial leadership partially influenced Bush's
shift away from a strong Taiwanese position.
The new leadership of Taiwan has also had important implications for the Obama
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administration and his ability to continue the policies of Bush. In 2008 the KMT took
over and Ma Ying-Jeou became president. The new Taiwanese administration is more
Beijing friendly than the Chen administration. As such this has eased tensions in the
conflict. Obama has not been forced to deal with strong separatist language and the
external constraints on policy formulation that accompany it. The effect of this is that it
has not constrained or forced Obama to act a specific way. Therefore the new political
leadership is favorable for Obama and his ability to formulate the policies that he desired.
Chapter VI: Conclusion
There are many factors that contribute to the final outcomes for each president,
however some of these aspects explained are more significant than others. The individual
level dynamics are not as influential as some of the other aspects. The president’s
personality and leadership style act as a template for the decision-making process, but it
does not guarantee nor fully explain how the president will act. The president is
constrained by many other internal and external factors that reduce the impact of the
president’s personality, morality, and ideological beliefs on decisions regarding Taiwan.
However, these factors still offer important insights into the three presidents’ grand
foreign policy plan towards Taiwan.
Some state-level factors are not as significant as others. Congress has an
important constraining influence on the president, yet it still fails to consistently push its
agenda on Taiwan. Congress is overwhelmingly supportive of Taiwan yet each of the
presidents has not enacted a foreign policy that fits within the ideology of Congress as a
whole. Congress has had some success in policy formulation, for example during the
1995-96 crisis, and it has successfully constrained the executive branch from straying too
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far from a pro-Taiwan stance. Thus Congress is not as important as other factors;
however it still plays a relatively significant role in ensuring the continuation of a proTaiwan strategy between the three presidents.
Taiwan and Chinese lobbyists also have had an impact on the continuation of
policy between each president; however, this influence is less than all other factors
examined. The United States Congress takes into account the Taiwan lobbyists, yet
Congress can only act so much. Chinese lobbyists have little to no influence in Congress,
and in certain cases they have actually increased sympathy towards Taiwan. The overall
lack of a unified position has also diminished the influence of the lobbyists. These factors
illustrate that the lobbyists do not have the same influence as other aspects of the threelevel analysis.
The military industrial complex remains one of the most important factors in
understanding the continuities between the presidents. Each president has authorized
arms deals in part because of the massive influence that the military industrial complex
has. The large military corporations have spent substantial amounts of money and have
become integrated in the decision-making process. The military industry also has
important functions within the government because of its impact on trade and the
domestic economy. As such the government often takes into account their lobbying. Even
though there are two conflicting treaties over arms selling and the Chinese adamantly
oppose such trading, the United States still continues to sell massive amounts of military
equipment. This thus illustrates the enormous impact that the military industrial complex
has on policy formulation.
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Systemic factors also play a substantial role in each of the presidents’ decisionmaking process and help explain both the changes and continuities between the
presidents. Because of the external constraints brought upon by 911 and China’s
economic and military rise, the presidents have had to shift and change their policy. The
president must act rationally within the realities of the international system. On the other
hand, the enormous advantage that the US has in military capabilities has increased the
options in which each president can utilize. As such, all three presidents can continue the
overarching policy of maintaining a peaceful status quo because of the deterrence factor
of the US military. The political realities of Taiwan are also important in why each
president has acted in the ways that they do. The political ideologies of the Taiwanese
government have had significant consequences that have altered the intensity of the
conflict and thus the policy that the president pursues.
The Taiwan-China conflict remains one of the most potentially destructive
international situations. If the conflict escalates into a shooting war, there are many
unknowns that could destabilize not only Eastern Asia, but the entire international
system. Relations between the three main actors involved have improved; however the
conflict is far from resolved. The rise of China does not seem to be slowing and as a
result the nature of the conflict could easily change in the future. As such in order to
understand the future, US decision-makers need to recognize on all three levels why the
US has continued yet changed many aspects of its policy towards Taiwan. This will allow
the current and future leaders of the US to more adequately understand the nature of the
conflict, which will therefore reduce the risk of the conflict boiling over into a heated
conflict.
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